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TWO PAPERS ON THE PROPOSED 
DECENTRALISATION IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PAPER ONE
THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH 
DISTRICT AUTHORITIES IN THE 
PROVINCES OF PAPUA NEW 
GUINEA1
Peter O’Neill
The subject of this paper is the District Authorities Act I have initiated, and 
parliament has enacted, to pave the way for 
the establishment of district authorities in the 
existing 89 open electorates throughout the 
nation. (The act is reproduced below.) This 
subject is very relevant to ongoing discussions 
and reviews of the public sector reform agenda. 
We live in a global village where 
technological changes, and overhauls of 
management and delivery systems occur daily 
— if not hourly. 
Papua New Guinea at present does not have 
the institutional or human resource capacity to 
compete on par with developed or wealthier 
nations, regionally or globally. We can, 
however, aspire to some degree of efficiency 
and best practice management as experienced 
in developed and other developing economies 
of the world. 
We can begin the process of attaining high 
levels of efficiency in government and public 
sector management, human resource use, 
and delivery of goods and services within a 
deliberately structured approach — even if only 
in a small way. We have to start somewhere. 
That is why I initiated the bill for an act of 
parliament to establish district authorities in 
the provinces. 
The District Authorities Act provides for the 
creation of a dynamic district administration 
structure within which local-level governments 
can participate in development, policy-making 
and wealth sharing. It is a structure that is 
intended to effectively interface national 
development goals and objectives with those of 
the districts. 
I see the eventual establishment of district 
authorities as an elevation of local-level 
governments’ capacities to articulate and 
construct sustainable development initiatives 
for their respective districts or local-level 
government areas. 
It envisages greater participation and a 
feeling of ownership of development policies 
and initiatives by district and local-level 
government decision makers. 
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It provides the means for active and direct 
participation of people in the process of 
effective and efficient government, providing 
opportunities for the people, institutions and 
interest groups who are at present excluded 
from the decision-making process or have been 
marginalized in the development process. 
I believe it is time for Papua New Guineans, 
especially the leaders of this nation, to become 
seriously focused on issues that impact on the 
nation’s gainful development, political stability, 
and capacity to deliver social and economic 
services to the population at large. 
Papua New Guinea has undergone 
numerous changes, public sector and market 
reforms, right-sizing, down-sizing, structural 
adjustments and institutional capacity-building 
programs over the last thirty years. But we are 
still in the trial and error mode. We are still 
conducting reforms; we have not hit the right 
chord yet. 
All of these exercises have been carried 
out in the interests of cost efficiency, equitable 
distribution of national wealth and development 
opportunities, maximized social and economic 
benefits to the people, efficient delivery of 
goods and services, poverty alleviation, and 
the creation of a foreign-investor-friendly 
reputation, amongst other things. 
I recently had the privilege of being given 
a comprehensive briefing by the National 
Economic and Fiscal Commission on the 
research analysis that organization has 
undertaken, on a province-by-province basis, 
of the distribution of public wealth, availability 
of road transport infrastructure, frequency of 
airline flights, availability of services such as 
electricity supply and banking facilities, and 
other indicators. The disparities in affluence, 
basic life-support services, and essential 
infrastructure between provinces are criminal. 
It is all too easy to say that we live in an 
imperfect country, governed by imperfect 
governments since independence, and forever 
struggling to make ends meet under ever-
changing economic, political and social 
conditions. If there are imperfections – and we 
can all point to numerous examples – then we 
must address them and create uniquely Papua 
New Guinean systems and structures to meet 
our nation’s and our people’s development 
needs. Those who are privileged to occupy 
political, public service, academic, or civic 
leadership positions cannot sit back and say 
that all is economically, socially and politically 
well in our nation. 
Our multi-tiered system of delivery of public 
services and national development programs is 
not responsive to our people’s or our nation’s 
development needs and aspirations. Services, 
development, and gainful wealth-generating 
opportunities have to be made more accessible 
to every man, woman and child of this country. 
Over 80 per cent of the national population 
are rural dwellers. The majority of Papua 
New Guineans live a subsistence existence in 
villages and hamlets within defined district 
and local-level council boundaries. They are 
not residents of urban centres. 
Government services, development, 
life-improvement and wealth-generation 
opportunities through improved and affordable 
compulsory education, health services and other 
social and economic services, must therefore be 
brought to the people. However, efforts to do 
this run into a lack of administrative capacity 
and structures to manage government funds 
and use resources effectively for development 
projects, public investment programs, and the 
provision of essential social services to our 
people. We need an appropriate administrative 
infrastructure to stop the rot. 
My response has been to initiate the act 
of parliament to establish district authorities 
in the provinces. The objective of the act is 
to establish Authorities to implement the 
principal administrative functions of the 
Organic Law on Provincial Governments and 
Local-level Governments as specified under the 
Local-level Governments Administration Act, 
1997. 
District authorities, when they are 
established, should be seen as vehicles, or 
enabling administrative structures, to ensure 
the wise use of public funds for social and 
economic development projects that will 
maximize the living standards of the people 
within defined district boundaries or open 
electorates. 
It is envisaged that the administrative 
structure that comes with the establishment of 
district authorities in each open electorate will 
remove cumbersome provincial bureaucratic 
red-tape, political preferences and biases, 
and other systemic flaws that have made it 
impossible to attain efficient delivery of basic 
life support and development services. 
The initiative to establish district 
authorities within the framework of the present 
system of provincial governments and local-
level governments is intended to improve the 
delivery of goods and services, good governance, 
and accountable and transparent distribution 
of public wealth, and bring development 
opportunities and public investment programs 
directly to the people. 
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Endnotes
1  This paper was presented to a seminar at the National 
Research Institute on 6 April 006.
The underlying intentions of establishing 
District Authorities are to ensure that: 
•	 government funding and development 
resources will reach and directly benefit 
populations residing within a defined 
district boundary; 
• elected leaders of the people, including 
council presidents, the MPs in respective 
open electorates or districts, and 
representatives each of churches, women 
and chambers of commerce, together with 
the district administrator and district 
treasurer as ex officio members, will 
participate in determining priorities for the 
allocation of development funding, and 
overseeing management control and the 
distribution of resources so as to accelerate 
improvement of the standards of living of 
the people; 
• an objective and result-driven 
administrative structure is developed for 
effective, equitable and efficient delivery of 
public services, government resources and 
development projects to populations living 
within the district or open electorate; 
• district and local-level government 
decision makers, the local MP, and other 
stakeholders and development partners 
get the opportunity to directly participate 
in making policies and decisions that 
determine the development agenda of their 
district and LLG area. 
The move towards setting up district 
treasuries compliments the district authorities 
concept, as it provides the vital financial 
services linkage. 
The district authorities will be supported 
by structural units, similar to the joint district 
planning and budget priorities committees 
chaired by the open MPs, which will meet 
twice in each three calendar months. 
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INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
THE CONSTITUTION
ALTERATION TO THE ORGANIC LAW ON PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS AND LOCAL-LEVEL GOVERNMENTS
THE Honourable Member for Ialibu Pangia, Peter O’Neill, proposes to alter the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-
Level Governments, and pursuant the Section 12(2) (Making of alterations to the Constitution and Organic Laws) of the Constitution, I,
Jeffery Nape, Speaker of the National Parliament, hereby publish the proposed law:-
Draft of: 20/01/06
INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PROPOSED LAW TO ALTER THE ORGANIC LAW ON PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS AND LOCAL-LEVEL
GOVERNMENTS
The Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments (Amendment No. ) Law
ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES
1. Provincial Government and Provincial Legislature (Amendment of Section 10).
2. The Deputy Provincial Governor (Amendment of Section 18).
3. Provincial and Local-level Administrative System (Amendment of Section 72).
4. Functions of the Provincial and District Administrator (Amendment of Section 74).
Draft of: 20/01/06
INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
ORGANIC LAW ON PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS AND LOCAL-LEVEL GOVERNMENTS (AMEND-
MENT LAW No.   )  LAW
being
A law to alter the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments and for related purposes, MADE by
the National Parliament
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Proposed Law on the Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments (Amendment Law No.    ) Law:- continued
1. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AND PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE (AMENDMENT OF SECTION 10).
Section 10 of the Organic Law is amended in Subsection 3 by repealing Paragraphs (b) and (c).
2. THE DEPUTY PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR (AMENDMENT OF SECTION 18).
Section 18 of the Organic Law is amended:-
(a) in Subsection (2) by repealing “Section 10(3)(b) and (c) and replacing them with the following:-
“Section 10(3)(a)”; and
(b) by repealing Subsections (3) and (4) and replacing them with the following:-
“(3)  If the Deputy Provincial Governor:-
(a) is dismissed from the office in accordance with Section 20; or
(b) is appointed:-
(i) a Minister or a Vice-minister in the National Government; or
(ii) the Speaker of Deputy-Speaker of the Parliament; or
(iii) the Leader or Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Parliament; or
(iv) the Chairman of the Permanent Parliamentary Public Works Committee; or
(v) the Chairman of the Permanent Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee; or
(vi) to an office which has powers and privileges equivalent to a those of a Minister; or
"(c) resigns his office by written notice to the Minister responsible for the provisional government and local-level
government matters; or, and
"(d) is, in the opinion of two medical practitioners appointed for the purpose by the National Authority responsible
for the registration or licensing of medical practitioners, unfit, by reasons of physical or mental incapacity, to
carry out the duties of his office; or
"(e) is otherwise disqualified by law or ceases to be a member of the Provincial Assembly or of the National
Parliament,
he shall be deemed to have vacated the office of the Deputy Provincial Governor.
"(4) If the Deputy Provincial Governor vacates his office in accordance with Subsection (3), the Provincial Assembly
shall elect the Deputy Provincial Governor in accordance with Subsection (2).
"(5) Where the Deputy Provincial Governor vacates his office in accordance with Subsection (3)(a), (b), (c) or (d), he
shall continue to hold office as a member of the Assembly, and is eligible to be re-elected as the Deputy Provincial
Governor”.
3. PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL-LEVEL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM (AMENDMENT OF SECTION 72).
Section 72 of the Organic Law is amended in Subsection (2)(a) by adding the following new subparagraph:-
"(iv) District Authorities; and”.
4. FUNCTIONS OF THE PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR (AMENDMENT OF SECTION 74)
Section 74 of the Organic Law is amended in Subsection (3) as follows:-
(a) By deleting the termination mark (full stop) in Paragraph (b) and adding the following:-
“;and:; and
(b) By inserting the following new paragraph:-
"(c) “policy direction, functions and directions as from time to time issued by the Authority or as directed to him by the
Authority.”.
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Draft of 07/12/05
INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
A BILL
for
AN ACT
entitled
District Authority Act 2005
ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES
PART I. –PRELIMINARY
1. Compliance with Constitutional Requirements.
2. Purpose and Object of the Act and Authorities.
3. Application.
4. Interpretation.
PART II. –DISTRICT AUTHORITY
Division 1. –Establishment of Authorities
5. Establishment, etc. of the Authority.
6. Functions of an Authority.
7. Powers on an Authority.
8. Head Office.
Division 2. –Composition of the Authorities
9. Composition on the Authority.
10. Filling of vacancies.
11. Chairman of the Authority.
12. Deputy Chairman.
DISTRICT AUTHORITY
13. Leave of Absence.
14. Resignation.
15. Vacation of office.
16. Vacancy not to affect powers and functions.
17. Meeting of an Authority
18. Disclosure of interest.
19. Committees of an Authority.
20. Reports.
21. Delegation.
22. Secretariat and support staff.
23. General Obligations.
24. Failure to co-operate with the Authority to amount to misconduct.
PART III. –FINANCE
25. Sources of finance.
26. Application of Public Finances (Management) Act 1986.
27. Application of Audit Act 1989
PART IV. –SUSPENSION
28. Suspension.
29. Effect of suspension.
30. Appointment of manager
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Arrangement of Clauses – continued
PART V. –MISCELLANEOUS
31. Agency functions.
32. Protection from personal liability.
33. Confidentiality.
34. Regulations.
Draft of 07/12/05
INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA
A BILL
for
AN ACT
District Authorities Act  2005
being
An Act to establish District Authorities for Districts and to define their powers and functions, and for related purposes,
MADE by the National Parliament to come into operation in accordance with a notice published in the National
           Gazette by the Head of State, acting on the advice of the Minister.
PART I. –PRELIMINARY
1. COMPLIANCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
(1) This Act, to the extent that it regulates or restricts a right or freedom referred to in Subsection III.3.C (qualified rights) of the
Constitution, namely:-
(a) the right to freedom from arbitrary search and entry conferred by Section 44 of the Constitution; and
(b) the right to privacy conferred by Section 49 of the Constitution,
is a law that is made for the purpose of giving effect the public interest in public welfare.
(2) For the purposes of Section 41 of the Organic Law on Provincial Government, it is hereby declared that this law relates to a
matter of national interest.
2. PURPOSE AND OBJECT OF THE ACT AND AUTHORITIES
The objects and the purposes of the Act and the Authorities are to implement the principal administrative functions as specified
under Section 45 (Principle administrative functions of the Local-level Governments) of the Organic Law on the Provincial
Governments and Local-level Governments of the Organic Law on the Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments to
achieve the following:-
(a) to bring governments funding and resources directly to the people within the Districts;
(b) to enable elected leaders of the people, to determine priorities for allocation of funding and to oversee management
control and distribution of resources so as to accelerate improvement of the standards to living of the people;
(c) to ensure that resources are equitably distributed in the Districts;
(d) to encourage co-operation among both the government and the non-governmental agencies or persons engaging in
development activities in the Districts.
3. APPLICATION
(1) Subject to the Organic Law, this Act applies to all Districts.
(2) Notwithstanding any other laws, all laws, acts, matters or things that are inconsistent with provisions of this Act are, to the
extent of inconsistency, invalid and effective and the provisions of this Act shall prevail.
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District Authority: -continued
4. INTERPRETATION
In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:-
“Authority” means a District Authority established under Section 5 of this Act;
“District” in relations to an Authority, means the area of Local-level Governments in and for which the Authority is
established;
“Member” means the Member of the National Parliament representing the electorate in the province which the Authority is
established;
“Organic law” means the Organic Law on the Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments;
“this Act” includes the Regulation.
PART II. -DISTRICT AUTHORITIES
Division 1 –Establishment of Authorities
5. ESTABLISHMENT, ETC., OF THE AUTHORITY
(1) A District Authority for each District in hereby established.
(2) The Authority:-
(a) is a body corporate with perpetual succession; and
(b) shall have a common seal; and
(c) may acquire, hold and dispose of property; and
(d) may sue and be sued in its corporate name.
(3) All courts, Judges and persons acting judicially shall take judicial notice of the common seal of the Authority affixed to a
document and shall presume that it was duly affixed.
6. FUNCTIONS OF AN AUTHORITY
Subject to this Act and the Organic Law, the functions of an Authority are:
(a) To assist in the proper and efficient administration and management of the District; and
(b) to assist in the proper and efficient administration of all government services including health, education, law
and order, infrastructure maintenance and extension services; and
(c) in consultation with the District Services of the Provincial and Local-level Government Administrative
Services to formulate policies in relation to the powers of the Local-level Governments under Section 44 of
the Organic Law; and
(d) in consultation with the District Administrator, to assist the Joint District Planning and Budget Priorities
Committee to perform its functions under Section 33A of the Organic Law; and
(e) make provisions for appointment of personnel to provide support services for Local-level Governments.
7. POWERS ON AN AUTHORITY
(1) Subject to this Act, an Authority has power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for or in connexion with the
achievements of its objects and the performance of its functions, and in principle achieving or promoting any of the subject
matters specified in Section 44 (Law Making powers on the Local-level Governments) of the Organic Law.
(2) Without limiting the generality of Subsection (1), the power of an Authority under that subsection includes power to:-
(a) take such action as it deems necessary or desirable for the maintenance of public assets for the benefit of the
people of the District; and
(b) carry out any such works for the benefit of the people in the District; and
(c) provide or co-operate with any department of the national government and a provincial government or other
body in providing any public or social service to the people in the District; and
(d) subject to this Act and Organic Law, do all such things as seem to it necessary or desirable for performing its
powers and functions under this Act.
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District Authority: -continued
8 HEAD OFFICE
An Authority shall have an office which, for the purposes of this Act and the Authority shall be referred to as the ‘Authority
Office’ and:-
(a) in which all the records and documents of the Authority shall be kept; and
(b) to which all correspondence shall be addressed; and
(c) subject to any direction of the Authority, in which all the meetings of the Authority shall be held.
Division 2 –Membership of Authorities
9 COMPOSITION OF THE AUTHORITY
(1) Subject to the Organic Law, the members of the Authority shall consist of:-
(a) the Member of Parliament representing the open electorate, ex officio; and
(b) the Presidents of the Rural Local-level Governments, ex officio; and
(c) the District Administrator, ex officio; and
(d) the District Treasurer, ex officio; and
(e) one person representing the Churches nominated buy the Council of Churches in PNG; and
(f) one person representing the PNG National Council of Women, nominated by the Council; and
(g) one person representing the Papua New Guinea Chamber of Commerce nominated by that Chamber
(2) The members of the Authority referred to in Subsection (1)(e), (f) and (g):-
(a) shall be appointed in accordance with the Regulatory Statutory Authorities Act  2004; and
(b) shall be appointed for a term not exceeding three years; and
(c) shall hold office on such terms and conditions as are determined under the Boards (Fees and Allowances) Act
(Chapter 299); and
(d) are eligible for re-appointment; and
(e) shall be ordinary resident in the District.
10 FILLING OF VACANCIES
Where there is a vacancy in the membership of the Authority (other than a vacancy in the offices referred to in Section 9(1)(a),
(b), (c) and (d):-
(a) an appointment to fill the vacancy shall, subject the Paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, be made as soon as
practicable and in any case not later than three months after the date on which the vacancy occurs; and
(b) the appointment shall be made in accordance with Section 9 and the person so appointed shall hold office,
subject to the Act, for the balance of his predecessor’s term of office; and
(c) where the vacancy occurs within three months before the expiration of the term of office the vacancy shall
remain unfilled for the remainder of the term.
11 CHAIRMAN OF THE AUTHORITY
(1) There shall be a Chairman of an Authority.
(2) The Member of the National Parliament representing the open electorate shall be the Chairman of the Authority.
12 DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
(1) The members of the Authority shall elect one of the members referred to in Section 9(b) to be the Deputy Chairman of the
Authority.
(2) Subject to this Act, except by express authority in writing by the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman may act as Chairman only
in the absence of the Chairman or if the Chairman is unable to perform the duties of his office.
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13 LEAVE OF ABSENCE
The Authority may grant leave of absence to a member of the Authority on such terms and conditions as the Minister determines.
14 RESIGNATION
A member of an Authority may resign his office by written notice to the Authority.
15 VACATION OF OFFICE
(1) A vacancy occurs when a member, other than the members specified under Section 9(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Authority:-
(a) becomes permanently incapable of performing his duties; or
(b) resigns his office under Section 14; or
(c) is without valid reason absent from three consecutive meetings of the Authority; or
(d) fails to comply with lawful directions of the Authority given under this Act; or
(e) becomes bankrupt, or applies to take the benefit of any law for relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors,
compounds with his creditors or makes an assignment of remuneration for their benefit; or,
(f) is convicted of an offence punishable under a law by a term of imprisonment for one year of longer and as a
result is sentenced to imprisonment,
the Minister shall terminate his appointment.
(2) The Minister may at any time by written notice advise a member, other than the members specified under Section 9(1)(a),
(b), (c) and (d), that he intends to terminate his appointment on the grounds of inefficiency, incapacity or misbehaviour.
(3) Within 14 days of the receipt of a notice under Subsection (2), the member may reply in writing to the Minister who shall
consider the reply, and, where appropriate, terminate the appointment.
(4) Where the member referred to in Subsection (2) does not reply in accordance with Subsection (3), his appointment is
terminated.
16 VACANCY NOT TO AFFECT POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
The exercise of a power or the performance of a function of an Authority is not invalidated by reason only of a vacancy in the
membership in the Authority.
17 MEETINGS OF AN AUTHORITY
(1) An Authority shall meet at such times and places as the Chairman determines, or, in his absence the Deputy Chairman
determines, but shall:-
(a) meet at least twice in each period of 3 calendar months; and
(b) not meet at the same time as the meetings of the National Parliament, the Provincial Assembly or a Local-
level Government
(2) Notwithstanding that the time and place have been determined under Subsection (1), a meeting of the Authority shall be
called:-
(a) By the Chairman or in the absence of the Chairman by the Deputy Chairman acting in his place, or
(b) By the members of the Authority, being a number not less than three, in writing, so request.
(3) Notice of a meeting shall be given personally or by post, by the Chairman or, at his direction, the Executive Officer to each
member at least seven days before the meeting is to be held.
(4) Where a direction or request is received for a meeting under Subsection (2), the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman acting in
his place shall call the meeting within 14 days of the receipt of the direction or request.
(5) At a meeting of the Authority:-
(a) three members, of whom the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman is one, are a quorum; and
(b) all matters before the meeting shall be determined in accordance with a majority of the votes; and
(c) the Chairman has a deliberative and, in the event of an equality of votes, a casting vote.
(6) Subject to this Act, the Authority may otherwise determine its own procedures.
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18 DISCLOSURE OF INTERESTS
(1) A member who has a direct interest in a matter being considered or about to be considered by an Authority shall, as soon as
possible after the relevant facts have come to his knowledge, disclose the nature of the interest at a meeting of the Authority.
(2) A disclosure under Subsection (1) shall be recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the Authority and, unless the Authority
determines otherwise, the member shall not:-
(a) be present during an deliberation of the Authority with respect the that matter; or
(b) take part in any decision of the Authority with respect to that matter.
19 COMMITTEES OF AN AUTHORITY
(1) An Authority may, from time to time, establish Committees of the Authority, to advice the Authority on such matter as the
Authority considers necessary.
(2) In establishing a Committee under Subsection (1), the Authority may:-
(a) appoint such persons, including members, as it considers necessary; and
(b) specify the functions, powers and procedures of the Committee.
20 REPORTS
(1) An Authority shall furnish the Minister responsible for Local-level Governments a report on the progress and performance of
the Authority in relation to its functions before 31 March each year and the Minister shall table such report at the first sitting
of the National Parliament each year.
(2) The Authority shall also furnish to the Ministers such other reports as the Minister may require at such intervals as the
Minister may determine.
21 DELEGATION
An Authority may delegate, by instrument under its seal, to any person or body of its powers and functions under than Act (except
this power of delegation).
Division 3. –Secretariat, etc.
22 SECRETARIAT AND SUPPORT STAFF
(1) The District Administrator shall:-
(a) be the Executive Officer of an Authority; and
(b) ensure adequate services and support staff is accorded to the Authority
(2) A person, required under Subsection (1)(b) to provide the services of the Authority, who is an officer of the National Public
Services:-
(a) shall be deemed to have been seconded to the support staff of the Authority; and
(b) shall, during his period of deemed secondment, be paid his salary and other entitlements as an officer or
employee of the State, by the government department or governmental body which, immediately prior to the
offer’s deemed secondment, the offer was employed with.
(3) The service on the support staff of the Authority of an officer shall be counted as services in the National Public Services for
the purposes of determining his rights(if any) in respect of:-
(a) leave of absence on the grounds of illness; and
(b) furlough or pay in lieu of furlough (including pay to dependants on the death of the officer).
23 GENERAL OBLIGATIONS
All government departments, public authorities, bodies, instrumentalities of the State, and their officers and employees are
required to cooperate and assist an Authority in carrying out its functions under this Act.
24 FAILURE TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE AUTHORITY TO AMOUNT TO MISCONDUCT
(1) Where a public authority referred to in Section 23 fails to co-operate or assist an Authority in the performance by the
Authority of its functions under this Act:-
(a) in the case of a public authority other than a Department – the person having deemed to have failed to co-
operate is considered to have been guilty of misconduct or misbehaviour and is liable to be dismissed or
removed from office; and
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(b) in the case of a Department – the Department Head and every officer concerned is guilty of negligence in the
discharge of his duties,
under the Public Services (Management) Act 1986 or any other appropriate law.
(2) For the purposes of Subsection (1), a government department, a public authority or public body or a person employed by a
government department, public authority or public body fails to co-operate with an Authority if it or he fails, within a
reasonable time:-
(a) to comply with a notice issued by the Authority; or
(b) to comply with a direction by the Authority; or
(c) to answer correspondence from the Authority; or
(d) otherwise, to assist the Authority in the performance of its functions to the extent that such assistance is
within the functions and powers of the public authority or person.
PART III. -FINANCE
25 SOURCES OF FINANCE
(1) The sources of finance for an Authority shall include:-
(a) grants and aids from the National Government, the Provincial Governments and the Local-level Governments
within the District; and
(b) contributions or donations from private persons and bodies; and
(c) fees for work carried out by the Authority on a contractual or agency basis for a governments or a private
person or body.
26 APPLICATION OF PUBLIC FINANCES (MANAGEMENT) ACT 1986
Part VIII of the Public Finances (Management) Act 1986 applies to and in relation to an Authority.
27 APPLICATION OF THE AUDIT ACT 1989
The accounts of an Authority shall be audited in accordance with Part III of the Audit Act 1989.
PART IV. –SUSPENSION
28 SUSPENSION
(1) Where in the opinion of the Minister:-
(a) the business of the Authority is:-
(i) being negligently, improperly, inefficiently, fraudulently or badly conducted; or
(ii) being so conducted in a manner that is not in the best interest or welfare of the District or of people
in the District; or
(b) An Authority is not properly carrying out it’s duties imposed under this Act or any other law,
the Minister may, by written notice addressed to the Chairman of the Authority, suspend the Authority, subject the
Subsection (2), for a period of two months within which an investigation shall instituted  and completed an
remedial action taken to correct the cause of the suspension.
(2) Unless a suspension under Subsection (1) is previously confirmed, varied or revoked by the Minister, it lapses at the end of
one month.
29 EFFECT OF SUSPENSION
The suspension of an Authority under Section 28 does not affect:-
(a) any right, privilege, obligation or liability, acquired, accrued or incurred by the Authority, or
(b) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of a suspended power or function; or
(c) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation or liability,
and any such right, privilege, obligation or liability may, subject to this Act, be carried on or enforced as if the
suspension had not taken place.
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30 APPOINTMENT OF MANAGER
(1) Where an Authority is suspended under Section 28, the Minister shall appoint a person to be the Manager for the Authority.
(2) Subject to any direction of the Minister, a Manager;-
(a) Has and may exercise on behalf of the Authority, such of the suspended powers and functions of the
Authority as are specified by the Minister in the instrument; and,
(b) Has such other powers, functions, duties and responsibilities as are prescribed
(3) Subject to the Salaries and Conditions Monitoring Committee Act 1988, the terms and conditions of appointment of the
Manager are as determined by the Minister.
PART V. –MISCELLANEOUS
31 AGENCY FUNCTIONS
An Authority may perform duties or responsibilities on behalf of the National Government, Provincial Government, Local-level
Government, or any other public body or instrumentality, as an agent or instrumentality of the National Government, Provincial
Government, Local-level Government, the public body or instrumentality, as the case may be, and on such terms and conditions
as are agrees upon.
32 PROTECTION FROM PERSONAL LIABILITY
The Chairman, Deputy Chairman or a member of the Authority, is not personally liable for any act or default of himself or the
Authority or for the purposes of this Act
33 CONFIDENTIALITY
(1) The Authority shall take all reasonable steps to protect from unauthorized use or disclosure, information given to it in
confidence in connection with the performance of its functions or the exercise of its powers under this Act
(2) For the purposes of Subsection (1), the disclosure of information as required and permitted by any law of court of competent
jurisdiction shall be considered authorized use and disclosure of the information.
(3) For the purposes of Subsection (1), the disclosure of information by a person for the purposes of performing that person’s
functions as:-
(c) person providing secretarial services to the Authority; or
(d) member of the support staff of the Authority; or
(e) member of the Authority
shall be considered authorized use disclosure of the information
34 REGULATIONS
The Head of State may, acting on advice, make regulations not inconsistent with this Act, prescribing all matters that by this Act
are required or permitted to be make or that are necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this
Act.
Printed and Published by K. Kaiub, Government Printer,
Port Moresby, -35.
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PAPER TWO
IMPROVED DECENTRALIZATION: 
THE WORK OF THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR REFORM ADVISORY 
GROUP1 
Graham tuck
The Public Sector Reform Advisory Group (PSRAG) was established with 
twelve appointed members by the previous 
prime minister, Sir Mekere Morauta, to give 
independent advice on any public sector reform 
matter that it thinks proper. The present prime 
minister has seen fit to have PSRAG continue 
with this work.
PSRAG’s first report, issued in October 
00, contained twelve priority initiatives, 
most of which were generally well received. 
However, one of those initiatives, number 
9, was ignored. Initiative 9 was for direct 
funding to local-level governments (LLGs) 
in line with the intent of the Organic Law 
on Provincial Governments and Local-level 
Governments (OLPGLLG), and for a review 
of the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government Affairs (DPLGA) to identify its 
responsibilities and resource requirements to 
fulfill those responsibilities. The main aim was 
strengthening the operations of DPLGA in 
relation to LLGs.
The lack of action on initiative 9 has spurred 
PSRAG to take a broader view of difficulties 
concerning decentralization, resulting in its 
second report, titled Improved Decentralisation. 
My comments are based on this second report, 
and generally restricted to the contents of 
chapters 1 and , although some leeway is 
allowed for drifting into brief references to 
recommendations in other chapters and related 
matters. Sir Barry Holloway is deputy chair of 
the PSRAG, and in that capacity will discuss 
in future National Research Institute (NRI) 
seminars some other aspects of the report, 
including proposed reforms to the provincial 
government and local-level government system 
and strengthening of communities.
NRI printed 100 copies of the PSRAG’s 
draft report, and these have been distributed as 
part of PSRAG’s consultation process. This is a 
draft version only, and PSRAG has agreed that 
five of the 9 recommendations be amended 
to reflect latest ideas, and parts of text also 
need revision. Irrespective of those changes, 
it is surprising how little substantial criticism 
has surfaced during the four months since its 
distribution, concerning the overall thrust of 
the report or its details.
Chapter 1, ‘Principles and introductory 
outline of the report’, commences by citing 
initiative 9 in the first report, then deals 
with the need for reform and related matters, 
and describes six principles identified by 
PSRAG for testing decentralization issues. 
For convenience, the various headings are 
retained.
Earlier recommendations
The national government adopted the first 
report of the PSRAG, which was issued in 
October 00.  Action has been taken on most 
recommendations, but not Priority Initiative 
number 9:
Restoring Capacity to Governments by:
•	 giving priority to the direct funding of 
Local-level Governments in accordance 
with the intent and spirit of the Organic 
Law on Provincial Governments and Local-
level Governments (OLPGLLG); and
•	 enabling the Public Sector Reform 
Management Unit (PSRMU) to conduct 
an immediate review of the Department of 
Provincial and Local Government Affairs 
(DPLGA) with regard to budgeting, and 
staff capacity for proactive service operations 
through Local-level Governments, to 
become effective next year.
The PSRAG based this recommendation on:
•	 support for direct assistance by the national 
government to LLGs, as provided for by the 
OLPGLLG;
•	 support for the OLPGLLG, without major 
legislative amendments; and
•	 central agencies realigning activities to 
achieve these objectives.
This soft approach to kick-start community 
development did not eventuate.  Lack of action 
has left LLGs largely irrelevant.
Pressures for reform
Since then, awareness of a need to improve the 
system of decentralization has grown. Responsible 
leaders agree that the present three-level 
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legislative system is expensive and inefficient. 
It does not satisfy the basic requirements of 
most citizens, and has not produced enhanced 
economic development. It has contributed to the 
nation’s declining human development.
The prime minister summarized the national 
perception at the National Development Forum 
in 004, at which he stated that:
•	 a review of decentralisation is overdue;
•	 the present system stifles community 
initiative and empowerment;
•	 the national government must support 
communities to become its partners;
•	 Papua New Guinea must avoid an economy 
of ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’;
•	 budget strategies should inject cash into 
communities to stimulate self-reliance and 
productivity;
•	  a more appropriate model of decentralisation 
is required to achieve social harmony, better 
living standards, and greater wealth; and
•	 to attain these objectives, Papua New 
Guinea must incorporate the Fifth National 
Goal and Directive Principle, which is ‘to 
achieve development primarily through the 
use of Papua New Guinean forms of social, 
political, and economic organisations’.
Government structures
The prime minister’s comments were founded 
on the concern that government structures are 
too complex.  Papua New Guinea now has three 
levels of government:
•	 a parliament comprising representatives 
of 0 provincial electorates and 89 open 
electorates;
•	 18 provincial governments, plus the 
National Capital District Commission, 
mostly comprising ex-officio members; and
•	 some 99 local-level governments in 18 
provinces, plus the Motu Koitabu Council 
and three urban local-level governments in 
the National Capital District (NCD).
The nation has three-levels of administration:
•	 national departments and agencies, some 
with direct responsibilities at the provincial 
level;
•	 18 provincial administrations, and the 
NCD administration; and
•	 8 district administrations under the 18 
provincial administrations.
In addition, there is:
•	 the Autonomous Bougainville Government 
and its LLGs, under its own constitution; 
and
•	 the Bougainville Provincial Administration 
and its district administrations, under 
special arrangements.
Recent actions by the national 
government
The national government has:
•	 instructed a review of the OLPGLLG; and
•	 funded the review by the National 
Economic and Fiscal Commission (NEFC) 
of intergovernmental finance, which has 
required:
v	 identifying current actual functions  
 of each level of government;
v	 determining the cost of delivering  
 services in each district and  
 province; and
v	 quantifying internal revenue  
 generated at the provincial level.
The Commission’s reviews are intimately 
connected to the operations and finances 
of provincial governments and LLGs.  The 
implementation of recommendations requires 
amendment to the OLPGLLG.
The Medium Term Development Strategy 
embodies the Overarching Development Strategy 
005-010 defined as:
export-driven economic growth, rural 
development, and poverty reduction, 
including through good governance 
and the promotion of agriculture, 
forestry, and fisheries and tourism, on 
an ecologically sustainable basis.  The 
strategy will be realised by empowering 
Papua New Guineans, especially those 
in rural areas, to mobilise their own 
resources for higher living standards.
The key to this strategy is empowering people 
to mobilize their own resources as a catalyst to 
development.
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Six principles concerning 
decentralization
In light of these considerations, the PSRAG 
identified six principles to test decentralization 
issues.  The six principles are:
•	 the Fifth National Goal;
•	 national government support;
•	 maintaining integrity of office;
•	 holding one office at a time;
•	 eliminating inefficiencies; and
•	 change only when justified.
The Fifth National Goal
Decentralization matters should generally 
conform with, and certainly not derogate from, 
the Fifth National Goal of the Constitution of the 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea.
The Fifth National Goal states:
This goal is pertinent to decentralization, 
because any decentralization that deviates 
from direct interaction with most people is not 
appropriate.
The Fifth National Goal is not resistant to 
change.  All societies change. Development by use 
of Papua New Guinean forms of social, political, 
and economic organization means integration of 
development by the people and for the people, as 
close to their terms and interests as possible.
The Constitution at s.5 [‘Implementation 
of the National Goals and Directive Principles’] 
states:
()  …. it is the duty of all governmental 
bodies to apply and give effect to them 
(National Goals and Directive Principles) 
as far as it lies within their respective 
powers.
() Where any law, or any power conferred 
by any law (whether the power be 
of a legislative, judicial, executive, 
administrative, or other kind), can 
reasonably be understood, applied, 
exercised, or enforced, without failing 
to give effect to the intention of the 
Parliament or to this Constitution, 
in such a way as to give effect to the 
National Goals and Directive Principles, 
or at least not to derogate them, it is to 
be understood, applied, or exercised, and 
shall be enforced, in that way.
National government support
Decentralization must be structured so that 
assistance, advice, and resources from the national 
government go direct to the level of government 
which interacts with communities. Papua 
New Guinea is a unitary state. More provincial 
autonomy is not automatically more progressive 
decentralization.
The Parliamentary Bi-Partisan Select 
Committee on Provincial Government had 
a clear view of this, as well as the consequent 
need of direct national government support for 
that level of government where participation by 
citizens is best achieved. Instead of recommending 
the abandonment of national responsibilities 
to lower levels of government, the Committee 
recommended a unified national public service 
to serve and monitor provincial governments and 
local-level governments, while grants and other 
resources from the national government, plus 
devolved taxing powers, form the basis for sub-
national revenues.
PAPUA NEW GUINEAN WAYS
We declare our fifth goal to be to achieve 
development primarily through the use of Papua 
New Guinean forms of social, political, and 
economic organisation.
WE ACCORDINGLY CALL FOR:
(1) a fundamental reorientation of our attitudes 
and the institutions of government, commerce, 
education, and religion towards Papua New 
Guinean forms of participation, consultation, 
and consensus, and a continuous renewal of 
the responsiveness of these institutions to the 
needs and attitudes of the people; and
() particular emphasis in our economic 
development to be placed on small-scale artisan 
service, and business activity; and
() recognition that the cultural, commercial, 
and ethnic diversity of our people is a positive 
strength, and for the fostering of a respect for, 
and appreciation of, traditional ways of life 
and culture, including languages, in all their 
richness and variety, as well as for a willingness 
to apply these ways dynamically and creatively 
for the tasks of development; and
(4) traditional villages and communities to 
remain as viable units of Papua New Guinean 
society, and for active steps to be taken to 
improve their cultural, social, economic, and 
ethical quality.
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The Committee saw the need for increased 
national assistance for LLGs.  It proposed:
a Commission for Urban and Rural 
Councils. The Commission shall 
comprise key advisers in law, finances and 
budgets, economics, engineering, and so 
on. The Commission shall also manage, 
supervise, control, provide training, and 
supply, all auxiliary public service for all 
councils throughout the country. Under 
this Commission, Village Services shall 
be construed as the most important unit, 
playing the crucial role in the provision 
of capacity, training, monitoring, and 
implementation of policies. Key areas of 
the Village Service Program shall include 
council staff, peace officers, village court 
magistrates and clerks, land mediators, 
village census recorders, and extension 
officers in various resource sectors vital 
to village progress.
Little of this proposal translated into the 
OLPGLLG. The few provisions are not used.  
The PSRAG takes up elements of this proposal 
by the Committee, including establishment of a 
commission for local government as now stated 
in Recommendation 7.
Maintaining integrity of office
Integrity of office must remain under national 
control. Effective decentralization does not 
devolve more responsibilities than can be handled 
at any level. Papua New Guinea is best served by 
retaining national control of offices that require 
great integrity. For this reason, offices in the 
judicial system, police, Ombudsman Commission, 
Office of the Auditor-General, and so on, must 
be under direct national control.
The corollary is that the greater the devolution 
of an office to lower control, the more parochial 
pressures may corrupt the integrity of that office. 
For example, a provincial judicial system can be 
compromised by local pressure when it has no 
extra-provincial authority to support, monitor, 
guide, or control its activities.
All occupants of political office (and others) 
answer to the Leadership Code concerning 
integrity of office. Similarly, holders of all other 
public offices must ultimately answer to the 
national government for their performance.
Holding one office at a time 
The Constitution provides at s.54(b) that 
in principle ‘no person shall hold more than one 
public office at the same time except where one 
such office is so much associated with, or related 
to, another, or where the holding of one such 
office is so relevant to the holding of another, 
as to make it desirable that the offices be held 
jointly’.
Administrative offices appear to comply 
with this, but the legislation now provides for a 
complexity of interrelated political offices that 
dissipates focus of office holders and may possibly 
offend against the intention of s.54(b). This 
is examined under the heading ‘Complexities 
of Offices’ and leads to Recommendation 
1 concerning a complete break between 
membership of lower level government and that 
of parliament.  
The implementation of Recommendation 
1 will fulfill the requirement of the principle 
that one office should be held at a time that 
PSRAG considers fundamental to effective 
decentralization.
Eliminating inefficiencies
Where possible, changes should reduce 
inefficiencies and barriers.
Change only when justified
Change should only be made when substantial 
benefits accrue. Substantial changes in the past 
were ill conceived, and few benefits resulted. 
There has been a trend not to sustain and fine-
tune reasonably successful models, but to abandon 
them for untried models.
Chapter  is titled ‘Learning from the Past’. 
It examines decentralization from 1949 to the 
present, and indicates matters that appear to be 
successful and not successful that are taken up 
in subsequent chapters and lead to formation of 
some of the report’s 9 recommendations. For 
convenience, headings are again retained.
Introduction to chapter 2
National development and poverty alleviation 
depend on improved sub-national service delivery. 
Achieving this objective requires overcoming 
economic and social disparities between regions 
and urban and rural areas, and reforming the 
fiscal, political, and administrative framework in 
which sub-national governments operate.
Papua New Guinea’s history of decentralization 
reveals that, when properly supported, local 
governments met many needs, but they were 
replaced. By contrast, the two versions of 
decentralization since 1975 which focused on 
provincial governments, have achieved little of 
value. Neither system of provincial government 
has interacted meaningfully with most people, 
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and neither system has generated substantial 
improvements to services. Both systems were 
associated with declining social indicators. The 
review suggests that more emphasis needs to be 
placed on local government.
Decentralization, 1949-1976
Local government:
•	 introduced democratic elections to most 
Papua New Guineans;
•	 promoted a structured system of planning 
and budgeting, and
•	 promoted community self-help through a 
head tax and community work.
During its greatest success, from 1965 to 
1975, local government required direct advice, 
management assistance, and financial aid from the 
administration. A range of generally tied grants 
and subsidies was available to local governments. 
The most significant was the Rural Development 
Program. This funding was tied to:
•	 approved projects selected by councils, 
based on perceived community needs, and
•	 local initiatives to collect and allocate local 
resources to each project.
This was a time of innovation in community 
empowerment, as seen in Kainantu Council’s 
scheme to establish eria komuniti as a form 
of ward committee, with the power to raise 
money for projects, by public subscription, 
receive money from the council, and operate 
bank accounts (Local Government Act 196 
[ss.9-55]).  This innovation was lost under the 
subsequent provincial government system.
Decentralization, 1976-1995
Before 1975, administration and government 
comprised two levels — the House of Assembly 
and national administration, and local government 
councils and the administrations they employed. 
The Organic Law on Provincial Government, 
which came into effect in 1976, introduced a 
three-level system of government — the national 
government, provincial governments, and local 
governments.  Provincial governments were 
given authority over local governments.
With no direct national government support, 
most local governments became ineffective. 
Provincial governments assumed the more 
interesting and lucrative local government 
responsibilities, and absorbed the grants and 
subsidies. Few benefits trickled down from 
provincial headquarters to districts and villages.
By the late 1980s, services were deteriorating 
and the provincial system was failing most 
people. This resulted in the establishment of the 
Parliamentary Bi-Partisan Select Committee on 
Provincial Government. The Committee toured 
the nation and recommended improvements 
to the system of provincial governments. Many 
recommendations proposed ways to reinvigorate 
councils and community governments, 
and included direct national government 
intervention.
Between 199 and 1995, another intervention 
illustrated the national government’s capacity 
for making significant changes at community 
level. Regardless of provincial government 
control of local government matters, the 
national government directly intervened in local 
government and community matters. The Village 
Services Scheme (VSS) was initially stated as 
having at least K50 per head available for local 
government and community reinvigoration. A 
national budget allocation of some K5 million 
saw a dramatic expansion of the VSS in 1994. 
Village court officials and land mediators received 
a top-up allowance, village recorders and tokples 
teachers were recruited, trained, and equipped, 
and councils and community governments were 
provided with direct grants for administration. 
These moves sparked immediate interest within 
communities and reactivated councils and 
community governments.
However, the introduction and operation of 
the OLPGLLG in mid 1995 saw these 199-1995 
developments overtaken by new policies. In mid 
1995, statements were made that the OLPGLLG 
continued the VSS. However, although the 
OLPGLLG [s.9(1)(b)] refers to local-level 
government and village services grants, most 
initiatives of the VSS were abandoned.
Decentralisation, 1995 to the 
present
The OLPGLLG, which applied to 18 
provinces from mid 1995, and to Bougainville 
from 1999, purported to encapsulate 
recommendations of the Parliamentary Bi-
Partisan Select Committee on Provincial 
Government. The Preamble to the OLPGLLG 
states that the system of provincial governments 
and LLGs is established for purposes of:
(i) maintaining our identity as a sovereign 
united nation; and
(ii) promoting equal opportunity and popular 
participation in government, at all levels; 
and
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(iii) providing especially the basic humanneeds 
for water, health, education, transportation, 
communication, accommodation, and 
social order, through economic self-
reliance;  and
(iv) promoting responsible citizenship, 
through self-management, control, and 
accountability for one’s actions.
These objectives are in accord with the Fifth 
National Goal.
The OLPGLLG contains conflicting 
provisions.  It:
(a) espouses ‘responsible citizenship 
through self-management, control, and 
accountability for one’s actions’, but 
generally does not provide for this to be 
achieved;
(b) provides for direct grants formulated on 
a base amount of K0 per head, despite 
the national government’s inability, or 
reluctance, to pay the guaranteed amounts;
(c) provides for the Salaries and Remuneration 
Commission to determine councillors’ 
allowances, but does not clarify the funding 
source for these entitlements;
(d) fails to provide for the scope of internal 
revenue, earlier established by the Local 
Government Act 196; and
(e) reduces the autonomy of LLGs (and 
provincial governments) by eliminating 
their right to employ staff according to their 
needs, or to operate and maintain their own 
accounts.
Key features of the reform are the relocation 
of LLGs under national government control, and 
the national government’s direct allocation of 
grants to LLGs.
Complexity of offices
The move has been to more complex systems, 
which are less able to operate effectively. The 
multiple political offices that are linked to those 
who hold the substantive offices of ward councillor 
or seats in parliament representing provincial 
electorates or open electorates, illustrate this.
Under the Local-level Governments 
Administration Act 1997, a ward councillor is:
•	 automatically chairperson of the ward 
development committee [s.7(a)];
•	 eligible for appointment to committees of 
the LLG [s.5(1)(b)];
•	 eligible for appointment as deputy head of 
the LLG [s.1()]; and
•	 eligible for election as head of the LLG 
[s.1(1)(b)].
Under the OLPGLLG, if the ward councillor 
is elected as head of the LLG, he or she is, in 
turn:
•	 automatically a member of the JDPBPC 
[s.A()(c)];
•	 automatically a member of the provincial 
assembly [ss.10()(b), 10()(c)];
•	 eligible for appointment as deputy provincial 
governor [s.18()];
•	 automatically a member of the provincial 
executive council, if appointed deputy 
governor [s.()(a)];
•	 eligible for appointment as chairperson 
of a permanent committee of provincial 
executive council, which, in turn means 
membership of the provincial executive 
council [s.()(b)];
•	 eligible for appointment to committees of 
the provincial assembly [s.16A()]; and
•	 eligible for appointment as chairperson of 
the JPPBPC, if a member of the provincial 
executive council [s.5()(a)].
Under the OLPGLLG, a member of 
parliament (MP), who represents a provincial 
electorate is:
•	 automatically a member of every JDPBPC 
in the province [s.A()(b)];
•	 automatically provincial governor [s.17()];
•	 automatically chairperson of the provincial 
executive council [s.()]; and
•	 eligible for appointment to permanent 
parliamentary committees and sessional 
and select committees (see Constitution 
ss.118(4), 11, 1), and to be chairperson 
or deputy chairperson of such committees 
(see Constitution s.119()).
Under the OLPGLLG, each MP representing 
an open electorate is:
•	 automatically chairperson of the JDPBPC 
[s.A()(a)];
•	 automatically a member of the provincial 
assembly [s.10()(a)];
•	 automatically a member of the JPPBPC 
[s.5()(b)];
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•	 eligible for appointment as chairperson of 
a committee of the provincial executive 
council, which, in turn, means automatic 
membership of the provincial executive 
council [s.()(b)];
•	 eligible for appointment to committees of 
the provincial assembly [s.16A()];
•	 eligible for appointment as a minister of the 
government (see Constitution s.141(a)), 
which, in turn, means membership of 
the National Executive Council (see 
Constitution s.149());
•	 eligible for appointment to permanent 
parliamentary committees and sessional 
and select committees (see Constitution 
ss.118(4), 11, 1), and to be chairperson 
of such committees (see Constitution 
s.119()); and
•	 eligible to hold another office, such as 
speaker, deputy speaker, or prime minister 
(see Constitution ss.107(), 141(a)).
Since 1997, there has been one legitimate 
and several purported elections of heads of LLGs 
to the office of provincial governor, which make 
further crossovers. These examples illustrate 
complexities that detract from governance. For 
governance to improve, a shift to simplicity is 
required.
Complexity of legislation
The move from one-level to two-level 
and three-level legislation has increased the 
complexity beyond the general capacity of 
governments at any level. This has been 
exacerbated by the redistribution of legislative 
functions with the coming into effect of the 
OLPGLLG, which has rendered almost all 
previous lower-level government legislation 
invalid.
Legislation in multi-level governments 
becomes more problematic as:
•	 legislation has to be fitted into the 
framework of the legislation of the national 
and sometimes provincial governments;
•	 there is decreasing, and usually almost 
no access to law libraries and statutory 
draftsmen at local and usually provincial 
levels; and
•	 national agencies with limited resources 
tend to focus on national responsibilities 
rather than enabling local template 
legislation to effect or facilitate provincial 
or legislation.
The results are seen very clearly in 
developments since the OLPGLLG came into 
effect. Some of the key pieces of supporting 
national legislation that are required by the 
OLPGLLG have not been enacted, and a number 
of important acts have been in place for decades 
but not amended to achieve compliance with 
the reform requirements of the OLPGLLG. 
Provincial governments and LLGs are partly 
crippled because most of the national acts that 
are required to enable them to raise their own 
revenue have either not been updated or not 
been enacted during the last ten years.
Division of functions between 
levels of government
The effective operation of the three levels 
of government requires a clear statement of the 
functional responsibilities between each of those 
levels. This clear statement of functions needs to 
be accompanied by awareness at each level of the 
functional responsibilities, and a commitment 
and capacity to undertake these functions.
As responsibilities for a sector, such as 
education, health, infrastructure, law and justice, 
primary industries extension, and so on, fragment, 
so does the capacity to coordinate, ensure, and 
deliver services.
Review of each sector shows that, in 
significant areas, the division of functions within 
each sector has led to a progressive decline in the 
delivery of services to the districts. This decline 
has become more rapid following the coming into 
effect of the OLPGLLG.
Balance of functions and 
finances between levels of 
government
The effectiveness of each level of government 
in a multi-level system depends on the appropriate 
distribution of functions, and of access to revenue 
for each level of government and administration. 
The access to revenue may be either by external 
revenue; that is, grants from one level of 
government to another, or by internal revenue; 
that is, the legal and administrative capacity of 
each level of government to generate revenue.
This appropriate distribution becomes all 
the more difficult with the increase in levels 
of government.  The overall review of finance 
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is the responsibility of the NEFC. Preliminary 
findings show that capacity and willingness 
of the national government to either transfer 
funds to match functions or to empower the 
lower levels of government to generate internal 
revenue to match functions has declined. This 
decline has become increasingly evident with the 
introduction of the OLPGLLG in 1995.
Complexity of administration
Analysis of the different levels of 
administration shows a declining ability to 
deliver services and provide and maintain 
infrastructure associated with complexity of the 
division of labour between different levels of 
administration. These are manifest at the district 
level with a lack of career paths, lack of training, 
absence of effective supervision and discipline, 
and inadequate equipment and facilities.
Other concerns
Other provisions of the OLPGLLG cause 
problems. Provincial governments, as established 
by the OLPGLLG, are not popularly elected. 
They are, by and large, removed from promoting 
equal opportunity or popular participation in 
government, providing basic human needs 
through economic self-reliance, or promoting 
responsible citizenship through self-management, 
control, and accountability for one’s actions. 
Most provincial governments are as far from 
direct interaction with people, as is Waigani.
Empowering people is not effective at the 
provincial level. Popular opinion from the late 
1980s revealed dissatisfaction with ineffective 
provincial governments. This led to their 
replacement by the present version, but current 
criticisms indicate disconnection between 
provincial governments, service delivery, and 
empowerment of the people.
However, too much emphasis may be placed 
on criticism of individual provincial governments, 
when system failures at national, provincial, and 
local levels, in both political and administrative 
arenas, are at the heart of our difficulties.
Discontinuity between the objectives of 
the OLPGLLG and the systems of government 
which it establishes, is a major flaw. The failure 
of provincial governments to implement 
empowerment may be inevitable, given the lack 
of direct connection to most people. Their place 
one step down from the national government 
and one step up from local government, insulates 
them from the people.
Summary
From these shifting policies, four related 
matters become apparent.
•	 Changes have substantial impact, but often 
little benefit.
•	 Concurrent with the devolution of 
responsibilities to the several successive 
versions of provincial government and local 
government, the national government has 
largely divested itself of the ability to deal 
with responsibilities at provincial and local 
levels. 
•	 The nation has lost almost thirty years 
of opportunities. Experimentation and 
failures may be expected, when refining 
systems. However, to ignore the possibility 
of refining systems, and instead repeatedly 
adopt major changes and end up with no 
level of government that is competent to 
deal with the needs of most citizens, is a 
long-term failure.
•	 The trend has been from simple to complex 
models, each further removed from the 
capacity of the nation and needs of most 
citizens.
The combined effect of the 9 
recommendations in this report is to present a 
paradigm shift in how decentralization is viewed. 
Instead of attempting to refine systems of 
government and responsibilities within a three-
level system in which national standards and 
basic social indicators are largely left to the whim 
or capacity of provincial governments and LLGs, 
this report cuts to the heart of the matter.  
Papua New Guinea is a small developing 
nation that requires much simpler and more 
appropriate systems that more readily allow all 
citizens and community groups to participate in 
their own betterment through direct national 
government intervention. Thirty years of 
increasingly complex decentralization that has 
generally abandoned the interests of the majority 
of people, has proven to be a wasteful detour of 
little benefit to the nation.  
Various earlier reports have clearly stated the 
need for empowering people to participate in 
their own betterment. For example, the report of 
the Parliamentary Bi-Partisan Select Committee 
on Provincial Government was strongly focused 
on national government action to reinvigorate 
communities and local government. However, 
policies to do this became subservient to 
accommodating provincial government, 
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as reflected in the OLPGLLG. Instead of 
entrenching more effective decentralization, the 
solid concepts offered by the committee became 
dissipated in an attempt to further refine the 
complex system based on the earlier Organic Law 
on Provincial Government.  
Now, the PSRAG’s recommendations build 
on those solid concepts.  Instead of attempting 
to accommodate the present government 
framework, the PSRAG recommends the removal 
of all identified impediments.  
The results may come as a shock to some 
leaders. However, the recommendations pass 
the litmus test of the six stated principles, and 
perhaps more importantly, meet the approval of 
the overwhelming majority of the many citizens 
and community groups consulted. Further 
refinement may be possible.  After all, no system 
of government – national or local – is beyond 
improvement. Systems of administration can 
also be refined, but the basic structures must be 
appropriate and strong.
Also, the PSRAG has not considered the 
perplexing matter of most appropriate form of 
representation at a level higher than communities 
and wards. That is, representational government 
that crosses ethnic and community lines. Apart 
from recommending the abolition of provincial 
electorates and an increased number of seats in 
parliament for representatives of open electorates 
and women, the PSRAG leaves the parliament 
and local government as is.  
The matter of representation may later be 
considered, as a refinement of the improved 
system of decentralization now recommended.
The PSRAG proposes 9 recommendations. 
These are developed and described in chapters  
to 11 which will be dealt with in later seminars.  
However, by way of a conclusion, 
recommendations derived from matters referred 
to in chapters 1 and  are now cited. These may 
be referred to again in later seminars, and should, 
of course, be studied in light of the combined 
effect of the ‘Improved Decentralisation’ report 
and all 9 recommendations.
1. The Constitution be amended at s.54(b) 
so that no person representing any sub-
national government can also be a member 
of parliament.
.   Provincial electorates and provincial seats 
in parliament be removed and the number 
of seats available for members representing 
open electorates be increased.
7. There be two levels of legislative 
government — the parliament and local 
government — and the provisions for 
provincial assemblies, be repealed.
8. The distribution of functions between 
the national government, provincial 
operations, and local governments be 
legislated by acts of parliament that 
provide for delegations to provinces 
according to circumstances and capacity, 
and not by an organic law.
1. Wards continue to be formed in sizes 
that are convenient for the people, in 
light of their affiliations and traditional 
communities. Where convenient, 
and where the number of wards is not 
excessive, current local-level governments 
be encouraged to merge into larger (i.e. 
district-wide) local-level governments.
17. Local-level governments may continue 
to collect head tax as a revenue source, 
and ward development committees and 
community groups be empowered by 
national legislation to collect project tax 
as seed money for community development 
projects.
18. The national government to make direct 
grants to local-level governments, and be 
set at an appropriate rate to meet their 
responsibilities.
19. Local-level governments to operate their 
own accounts, while provincial and district 
treasuries take on support and supervisory 
roles.
7. Supervision and support for local-level 
governments, including employment 
arrangements, be consolidated under a 
commission headed by a commissioner for 
local government.
8. A functional and expenditure review 
be carried out within and beyond 
the Department of Provincial and 
Local Government Affairs, to identify 
resources required for implementation of 
responsibilities, including the operation 
of the National Monitoring Authority and 
its provincial inspectorates, and provincial 
and district administrations.
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Endnotes
1  This paper was presented to a seminar at the National 
Research Institute on 6 April 006.
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